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CHAPTER 5
Dialog across the Taiwan Strait: 
what does the peaceful reunification mean?
Łukasz Gacek
China’s opening policy and the first proposals on the national reunification
The question of Taiwan reunification with China remains one of the major 
points in Beijing’s foreign policy. Lasting from 1949 until the 1980s, the lack of 
dialog with the authorities in Taipei led to regular tensions, and increased the 
threat of China’s invasion on the island. The situation changed completely at 
the end of the 1970s, when ‘China’s open policy’ was initiated by Deng Xiao­
ping, the leader of the country. Simultaneously with the discussion about Tai­
wan’s future, Beijing began negotiations with the United Kingdom and Portu­
gal, regarding the status of the former colonies, Hong Kong, and Macau. On 30th 
September 1981, Ye Jianying, the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress, said that after the reunification, “Taiwan can enjoy 
a high degree of autonomy as a special administrative region.” He also pro­
posed the discussions held on an equal footing between the Chinese Commu­
nist Party and the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT).1 On the basis of these 
assumptions, on 11th January 1982, Deng Xiaoping formulated the famous idea, 
‘one country, two systems.’ According to this, the national reunification al­
lowed for the possibility to continue the socialist system on the continent, and 
capitalism in Taiwan.2
1 The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China (August 1993), in: Zhongguo Zheng- 
fu Baipishu (1991-1995), (White Papers of the Chinese Government), Information Office 




The answer from the island came at the end of the 1980s. At that time, 
Taiwan authorities showed their attitude toward China by adopting many of 
the assumptions of the idea of greater openness. Beginning in November 1987, 
Taiwan officially permitted its residents to visit their relatives in the mainland 
China. Later, a special document, The Guidelines for National Unification, was pre­
pared. It was adopted by the National Unification Council, an advisory body of 
the Taiwan’s government, at its third meeting on 23rd February 1991, and by 
the Executive Yuan Council at its 2223rd meeting, on 14th March 1991. The Guide­
lines outlined a three-phase approach for the unification:
1. Short term - A phase of exchanges and reciprocity;
2. Medium term - A phase of mutual trust and cooperation;
3. Long term - A phase of consultation and unification.3
3 Guidelines for National Unification, adopted by the National Unification Council 
at its third meeting on 23rd February 1991 and by the Executive Yuan Council at its 
2223rd meeting on 14th March 1991, http://law.wustl.edu/chinalaw/twguide.html (Feb­
ruary 7, 2012).
Two months after adopting The Guidelines, the President of the Republic of 
China (Taiwan) Lee Teng-hui announced that the ‘Period of Mobilization 
against Communist Rebellion’ would be terminated on 1st May 1991. Almost at 
the same time, a few institutions responsible for the development of the cross­
Strait relations and unification process were established. In September 1990, 
the National Unification Council (NUC) was created, and the Executive Yuan’s 
Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) was founded in January 1991. In February, 
MAC approved the formation of a private non-profit organization - the Straits 
Exchange Foundation (SEF). Beijing’s response to these institutions was the 
establishment of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait 
(ARATS) in the middle of 1991. In November 1992, in Hong Kong, quasi-official 
representatives from Taiwan and China reached an agreement on acceptance 
of the ‘one China’ principle on both sides of the Strait of Taiwan, indicating the 
differences in the interpretation of this term. It began with the historic meet­
ing between SEF’s Chairman Koo Chen-fu and ARATS’s Chairman Wang Dao- 
han, held in Singapore, in April 1993. These were also the first high-level non­
governmental talks across the Straits. The ‘Taiwan Consensus’ or the ‘1992 
Consensus,’ reached in Hong Kong in 1992, and Koo-Wang talks, became the 
basis for further cross-Strait dialog.
Beijing’s position in the negotiations remains unchanged. The Taiwan Ques­
tion and Reunification of China published on the continent in August 1993 says 
that: “it is the sacred right of each and every sovereign State and a fundamen­
tal principle of international law to safeguard national unity and territorial 
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integrity.”4 Additionally, it states: “lying off the southeastern cost of the China 
mainland, Taiwan is China’s largest island and forms an integral whole with 
the mainland. Taiwan has belonged to China since ancient times”5 and “reuni­
fication of the country embodies the fundamental interest of the Chinese na­
tion.”6
4 The Taiwan Question and Reunification..., p. 294.
5 Ibid., p. 295.
6 Ibid., p. 314.
7 The 8-Point Proposition Made by President Jiang Zemin on China's Reunification, Em­
bassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of America, http://www. 
china-embassy.org/eng/zt/twwt/t36736.htm (February 7, 2012).
On 30th January 1995, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of China and the President of the People’s Republic 
of China, Jiang Zemin, in his speech (Continuing to Strive Toward the Reunification 
of China) put forward eight propositions for the development of the cross-Strait 
relations and peaceful reunification of China. He talked about adhering to the 
principle of ‘one China,’ and conducting negotiations with the Taiwanese au­
thorities that would lead to a peaceful reunification. China allowed Taiwan to 
develop non-governmental economic and cultural ties with other countries, 
but also strongly opposed foreign intervention in the case of China’s reunifica­
tion and ideas connected with Taiwan’s independence. Jiang also appealed to a 
closer economic and cultural integration referring to common roots.7
These points closely correspond with the general stand of China's policy 
toward the island. It is fully expressed in the formula described as the ‘Three 
No’s’ Principles on Taiwan. China opposes the independence of Taiwan, the 
idea ‘one China, one Taiwan’ or ‘two Chinas,’ and its membership in any inter­
national organizations which consist of sovereign states.
In the document The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China Beijing for­
mulated major points of its ‘peaceful reunification - one country, two systems’ 
policy (heping tongyi -yi Hang zhi). This program focused on four areas. The first 
mentioned “only one China” (yi ge Zhongguo), which means that Taiwan is “an 
inalienable part of China and the seat of China’s central government is in Bei­
jing.” The second indicated the “coexistence of two systems” (Hang zhi bingcun), 
socialism on the mainland and capitalism on the island. The third offered “a 
high degree of autonomy” (gao du zi zhi) to Taiwan. In that case Taiwan would 
be treated as a special administrative region with its own administrative and 
legislative powers, an independent judiciary, right of adjudication on the is­
land, its military forces and its own party, political, military, economic, and 
financial affairs. Taiwan could also conclude some commercial and cultural 
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agreements with foreign countries. The last point indicated ‘peace negotia­
tions’ (heping tanpan).8 *101
8 The Taiwan Question and Reunification..., pp. 305-307.
’ An Idea for the Peaceful Reunification of the Chinese Mainland and Taiwan, June 26, 
1983, (Excerpt from an interview with Professor Winston L. Y. Yang of Seton Hall Uni­
versity, South Orange, New Jersey, USA), in: Xiaoping Deng, Selected Works of Deng 
Xiaoping, Vol. 3 (1982-1992), Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1994.
10 “Lee Teng-hui responds to Jiang Zemin,” Taiwan Communique, No. 66, June 
1995, http://www.taiwandc.org/twcom/66-no4.htm (February 7, 2012).
11 ibidem.
Beijing only referred to the issue of autonomy and nothing more. This 
point of view has already been formulated by Deng Xiaoping in the middle of 
1983, when he excluded the possibility of‘complete autonomy’ for Taiwan. The 
autonomy could not have been unlimited. Therefore, if it was limited, it could 
have not been complete. A complete autonomy, in his opinion, would actually 
lead to the recognition of two separate states, and mean ‘two Chinas, not one.” 
In this context, Beijing underlined that its proposal had a peaceful dimension, 
and the process of unification should have been conducted through mutual 
negotiations.
Taiwan’s attempts to test its official status. Negotiations in a deadlock
In the 1990s, Taiwanese leaders transformed the major guidelines of their for­
eign policy. It happened in consequence of the fact that the first native Taiwa­
nese, Lee Teng-hui, came to power. During his presidency, the determination 
of the Taiwan authorities to describe the new bases of cross-Strait consulta­
tions could be observed. The official Taiwan’s response to Jiang Zemin’s ‘eight 
points’ was formed in January 1995, and was presented by President Lee Teng- 
hui on 8th April 1995 during the meeting of the National Unification Council. 
He underlined “the fact that Taiwan and China are two separate entities.”10
That is why Beijing should respect the fact that since 1949 Taiwan and 
mainland China have been governed as two political sovereign entities. He also 
mentioned the necessity to strengthen bilateral exchanges based on common 
culture, promotion of trade, and economic relations, ensure that both sides 
participate in international organizations, acceptation of the principle of re­
solving all disputes through bilateral peace talks, and promotion of legal de­
mocracy in Hong Kong and Macau.11
In 1999, Lee Teng-hui went a step further. In May, he published the book 
The Road to Democracy, which propagated the division of China into seven re­
gions enjoying full autonomy: “Taiwan has its own identity as Taiwan, Tibet as 
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Tibet, Xinjiang as Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia as Inner Mongolia, and the Tungpei 
as the Tungpei. Ideally, if each one were allowed to affirm its own existence, 
we would see Asia’s regional stability enhanced. For purposes of effective 
management alone, ‘Greater China’ would be better off divided into perhaps 
seven autonomous regions, which could then compete among themselves and 
with the world progress. But no such decentralization of power is likely to 
come about soon. That will not happen until Peking recognizes the autonomy 
and unique culture of each of these regions and gives them due respect.’’12 He 
also argued that, “as long as China maintains its hegemonic stance, peace will 
probably not come to Asia. The idea of a hegemonic, nationalistic ‘Greater Chi­
na’ is unquestionably a threat to mainland China’s neighbors.”13 According to 
this idea, on 9th July, in the interview for Deutsche Welle, Lee Teng-hui described 
cross-Strait relations as a ‘state-to-state relationship’ or at least a ‘special 
state-to-state relationship.’ He mentioned that in 1991 Taiwan de facto seized to 
extend its sovereignty over the continent, because Article 10 of the Additional 
Articles (now Article 11) “limits the area covered by the Constitution to that of 
the Taiwan area, and recognizes the legitimacy of the rule of the People's Re­
public of China on the Chinese mainland.”14 What is more, Articles 1 and 4 of 
the Additional Articles stipulated that “the members of the Legislative Yuan 
and the National Assembly shall be elected from Taiwan area only.”15 In this 
way, Beijing government’s attempt to characterize Taiwan as a ‘renegade 
province’ is historically and legally groundless. Taiwan also tried to show that 
it differed from Hong Kong and Macau, because it was not a colony of any na­
tion. President Lee Teng-hui pointed out that Taiwan would continue cross­
Strait exchanges, and promote dialog and consultations. He expressed faith 
that “the Taiwan experience can serve as a catalyst for the modernization and 
democratization of the Chinese mainland.”16
12 Teng-hui Lee, Road to democracy. Taiwan's Pursuit of Identity, Tokyo: PHP Insti­
tute, Inc., 1999, pp. 182-183.
11 Ibid., p. 182.
14 Responses to Questions Submitted by Deutsche Welle (Voice of Germany) Lee Teng-hui, 
in: Getting Real, International Media Perspectives on the Special State-to-state Relationship 
Between the ROC and the PRC, Taipei: Government Information Office, 1999.
15 Ibidem.
16 Ibidem.
When China took over Hong Kong on 1st July 1997 on the basis of the ‘one 
country, two systems’ formula, a lot of speculations about using the same ap­
proach to Taiwan appeared. But the Taiwanese authorities refused to take up 
any negotiations under the circumstances proposed by Beijing. They under­
lined that they accepted the ‘one China’ principle, but for them ‘one China’ 
meant the Republic of China on Taiwan. They argued that Taiwan had all 
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attributes of a sovereign state. They often referred to the Convention on the 
Rights and Duties of States signed at Montevideo in 1933. Article 1 of the treaty 
defined a state using four criteria: a permanent population, a defined territory, 
government, and capacity to enter into relations with the other states.17
17 Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Signed at Montevideo, Uruguay, De­
cember 26, 1933, Washington D.C.: Department of International Law, Organization of 
American States, http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/a-40.html (February 9, 
2012).
18 "Taiwan Stands Up: Advancing to an Uplifting Era,” May 20, 2000, in: A New Era 
of Peace and Prosperity: President Chen Shui-bian's Selected Addresses and Messages (1), Tai­
pei: Government Information Office, 2001.
19 Ibidem.
20 “One-China Principle Allows for No Evasion or Ambiguity,” Xinhua, People’s 
Daily on May 22, 2000.
Actually, two Chinese governments, independent of each other, had ex­
isted for over sixty years. During the last twenty years, Taiwan’s opposition 
built its own popularity by using these arguments. Since the beginning of its 
existence in 1986, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) built their capital by 
adhering to the ‘Taiwan independence' idea that advocates ‘one country on 
each side' of the Taiwan Strait. The ruling party, Kuomintang, was criticized 
for a too soft approach to China. In 2000, the pro-independence Democratic 
Progressive Party came to power. The party’s candidate, Chen Shui-bian, also 
won the presidential elections. But when Chen took the office, he avoided an 
open confrontation with China. He tried to strengthen the Taiwanese identity, 
but did not underline the issue of independence. On 20th May 2000, in his inau­
gural speech he declared: “Therefore, as long as the CCP regime has no inten­
tion to use military force against Taiwan, I pledge that during my term in of­
fice, I will not declare independence, I will not change the national title, I will 
not push forth the inclusion of the so-called ‘state-to-state’ description in the 
Constitution, and I will not promote a referendum to change the status quo in 
regards to the question of independence or unification. Furthermore, the ab­
olition of the National Reunification Council or the National Reunification 
Guidelines will not be an issue.’’18 In his speech a controversial statement con­
nected with the ‘one China’ principle appeared. On the one hand he officially 
accepted it, but on the other hand he said that it was the issue that was to be 
dealt with in the future.19 Beijing immediately responded. Xinhua News Agency 
argued that the ‘one China’ principle left no room for evasiveness or ambigui­
ty: “Anybody who dares insist on splitting Taiwan from China, in spite of the 
warning from the Chinese government and people, must bear responsibility 
for all the serious consequences arising therefrom.”20 Beijing indicated that it 
meant that “the new Taiwan leader does not want to improve cross-Straits 
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ties.” Chinese officials argued that Taiwan had been a part of China since an­
cient times and stressed that “Taiwan independence is a road to destruction, 
reiterating that the Taiwan issue cannot continue to be unresolved indefinite­
ly.”21
21 “One-China Principle Is Not Saddled on Taiwan,” Xinhua, People's Daily on May 
23, 2000.
22 Anti-Secession Law, Adopted at the Third Session of the Tenth National People's 
Congress on March 14, 2005, http://www.china.org.cn/english/20051h/122724.htm 
(April 18, 2012).
When pro-independence groups rose to power, Beijing was forced to 
slightly modify the former standpoint. It was also a result of the fact that a 
generational shift occurred in China, and the politicians of the 4th generation, 
under the leadership of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, rose to power. In compari­
son to their predecessors, the new supervision of the communist party 
adopted a more pragmatic standpoint toward Taiwan. The atmosphere of ne­
gotiations, which was not too favorable, resulted in the need to take conserva­
tive actions, which would preserve the status quo in the Strait. At the same 
time, it should be mentioned that China’s internal problems related to the 
outbreak of SARS brushed the issue of Taiwan aside. However, despite the visi­
ble suspension of the political dialog, the economic sphere experienced a clear 
animation. At that time, the model of ‘three links,’ concerning direct trade, 
and transport and postal connections, was shaped. The scheme was first pro­
posed by the mainland Chinese who pointed to the possibility of establishing a 
better understanding and presented it as a factor that could have been condu­
cive to future unification.
What is more, in March 2005, China announced the document Anti­
Secession Law. Article 2 of this document said that: “There is only one China in 
the world. Both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China. China’s sover­
eignty and territorial integrity brook no division. Safeguarding China’s sov­
ereignty and territorial integrity is the common obligation of all Chinese 
people, the Taiwan compatriots included. Taiwan is part of China. The state 
shall never allow the ‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist forces to make Tai­
wan secede from China under any name or by any means.”22 However, the 
most controversial was Article 8, which could suggest Beijing’s determination 
to potentially using military force to prevent Taiwan from establishing inde­
pendence: “In the event that the ‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist forces 
should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan’s se­
cession from China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession from 
China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be 
completely exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other 
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necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
The State Council and the Central Military Commission shall decide on and 
execute the non-peaceful means and other necessary measures as provided for 
in the preceding paragraph and shall promptly report to the Standing Commit­
tee of the National People’s Congress.”23 There were many arguments that 
Beijing tried to use this document to deny the sovereignty of Taiwan. The ma­
jor point of China’s policy towards Taiwan remained unchanged and was con­
tained in the ‘one country, two systems’ formula. Despite the criticism of the 
Taiwanese and the international communities, these resolutions adopted by 
China did not cause violent tension in the East Asia region. These assumptions 
were a confirmation of a pragmatic approach of the Chinese side. The possibili­
ty of using force was significantly narrowed and reserved only to two cases: 
proclamation of independence of the island or intervention of foreign forces. It 
was a sign that Beijing was straying off the rhetoric of permanent threats of 
using force, and started to move toward negotiations based on new principles.
23 Ibidem.
24 "KMT’s Ma to promote cross-Strait ties," China Daily on July 19, 2005.
Thereafter, China’s Communist Party strengthened its contacts with Tai­
wan’s opposition party, Kuomintang. The visit of the Chairman of KMT, Lian 
Chan, on the mainland in April 2005 was of great importance. It was the first 
visit of such a prominent Taiwan’s politician since 1949. This event confirmed 
that there was no coherent vision of all major Taiwan’s political parties to the 
problem of the future ties with China. While Kuomintang opted to develop 
more intensive contacts with the mainland, Democratic Progressive Party 
proclaimed a completely different program focused on obtaining greater inde­
pendence. In July 2005, the newly elected Chairman of KMT, Ma Ying-jeou, 
declared the promotion of exchanges between Kuomintang and the Commu­
nist Party of China “for peace, prosperity and development across the Taiwan 
Strait.”24 It was the first time when the General Secretary of the CPC sent a 
letter of congratulations to KMT’s leader.
Kuomintang comes to power. The new opening in cross-Strait relations
In the report to the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 
October 2007, Hu Jintao called again for peaceful dialog across the Taiwan 
Strait. He said: “Here, we would like to make a solemn appeal: On the basis of 
the on-China principle, let us discuss a formal end to the state of hostility be­
tween the two sides, reach a peace agreement, construct a framework for 
peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, and thus usher in a new phase 
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of peaceful development.”25 He also appealed to increase cultural and econom­
ic exchanges. It is worth saying that he especially declared the support of eco­
nomic development on the west shore of the Straits, in Fujian province and in 
other areas where Taiwan investments were concentrated.26 These declara­
tions were a clear signal of the changes that could have been be observed in 
the following year in Taiwan. In the election to the Legislative Yuan in January 
2008, the KMT and its smaller ‘pan-blue’ allies won an absolute majority. 
Moreover, two months later, the candidate of KMT, Ma Ying-jeou, won the 
presidential elections.
25 Jintao H u, Hold the Great Banner of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics and Strive 
for New Victories in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects, Report to the 
Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China on October 15, 2007, 
Documents of the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Beijing: Foreign 
Language Press, 2007, p. 57.
26 Ibid., p. 58.
27 Presidential Election and Referendums - PRESS KIT Fact Sheet No. 6 Referen­
dum Proposals, March 22, 2008, Taipei: Government Information Office, 2008, 
http://www.gio.gov.tw/elect2008/kit_06.htm (February 9, 2012).
28 President Ma’s Inaugural Address, May 20, 2008, Office of the President Republic 
of China (Taiwan), http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid= 
16304&rmid=2355&wordl=President+Ma%27s+Inaugural+Address (February 9, 2012).
29 Ibidem.
On the same day as the presidential elections were held, two referendums 
on participation of the Republic of China in the United Nations were held. The 
first, proposed by the ruling party DPP, concerned the UN membership under 
the name ‘Taiwan.’ The second, supported by KMT, called on the government 
to apply for the restoration of the nation’s UN membership, and for the entry 
into other international organizations under the name ‘Republic of China’ or 
any other appropriate name.27 These questions were not solved because of the 
low number of voters participating in these referendums.
The electoral victory of Kuomintang intensified mutual ties with China. In 
April 2008, Taiwan’s Vice President and Chairman of the Taiwan-based cross­
Strait Common Market Foundation, Vincent Siew, met with Hu Jintao at a re­
gional economic forum in Boao, on Hainan (Boao Forum for Asia). A month 
later, Ma Ying-jeou in his inaugural speech outlining the goals of his presiden­
cy declared that Taiwan under the principle of ‘no unification, no indepen­
dence and no use of force’ would maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. 
He also underlined the necessity of mutual consultations with Beijing over 
Taiwan’s “international space and a possible cross-Strait peace accord.”28 He 
argued that isolating Taiwan in the international arena was an obstacle to the 
development of the cross-Strait relations based on trust.29 In July, China and 
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Taiwan agreed for the first time to enable direct flights for tourists. By the end 
of 2011, forty one cities on the Chinese mainland and nine cities in Taiwan 
implemented the cross-Straits direct flights.30 In November 2008, the Associa­
tion for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait’s Chairman, Chen Yunlin, arrived in 
Taiwan. It was the first visit of ARATS’s Chairman on the island. There, he met 
with President Ma Ying-jeou and the Chairman of the Taiwan’s Straits Ex­
change Foundation (SEF), Chiang Pin-kung. From June 2008 (Beijing) to Octo­
ber 2011 (Tianjin), seven rounds of talks between Chiang Pin-kung and Chen 
Yunlin were held.
30 “Cross-Straits trade hits record $147b," Xinhua, China Daily on January 18,2012.
31 Message to Compatriots in Taiwan, January 1, 1979, http://www.china.org.cn/ 
english/7943.htm (February 9, 2012).
32 Jintao H u, Let Us Join Hands to Promote the Peaceful Development of Cross-Straits Re­
lations and Strive with a United Resolve for the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation, 
Speech at the Forum Marking the 30th Anniversary of the Issuance of the Message to 
Compatriots in Taiwan, Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC, December 31, 
2008, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/en/Special/Hu/201103/t20110322_1794707.htm (Feb­
ruary 9, 2012).
On 31st December 2008, President Hu Jintao delivered a very important 
speech commemorating the 30th anniversary of the Message to Compatriots in 
Taiwan, which was first issued by the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress on 1st January 1979. In this document, Beijing diametrically 
changed its hard position in favor of peaceful reunification approach. On that 
day, the Chinese government ordered the People's Liberation Army to stop the 
bombardment on the islands belonging to Taiwan. The communist party for 
the first time appealed to the Taiwanese authorities to end the military con­
frontation across the Taiwan Strait and initiate a dialog “to create the neces­
sary prerequisites and a secure environment for the two sides to make con­
tacts and exchanges in whatever area.”31 Referring to the historic Message, 
President Hu introduced six proposals to promote the peaceful development of 
the cross-Strait relationship:
- To firmly abide by the one-China principle and enhance political mutual 
trust;
- To advance economic cooperation and promote common development;
- To promote Chinese culture and strengthen spiritual bonds;
- To strengthen two-way visits of people and expand exchanges in various 
circles;
- To safeguard national sovereignty and hold consultations on external 
affairs;
- To end the state of hostility and reach a peace agreement.32
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By proposing these six points China wanted to underline its will to con­
tinue negotiations for peaceful reunification which were to be focused on eco­
nomic and cultural cooperation. But it is worth saying that the major issue of 
sovereignty is still interpreted according to Beijing’s will. There were no spe­
cific assumptions about the short-term solutions. This speech was full of ideas 
without a clearly specified period of their implementation.
It seems to meet the expectations of the other side. Taiwanese authorities 
prefer to concentrate on economic issues. Economy remains the main field of 
mutual cooperation. In June 2010, the two sides signed the most important 
agreement since 1949. The Economic Co-operation Framework Agreement (ECFA) 
allows cutting tariffs on 539 Taiwanese exports to China and 267 Chinese prod­
ucts entering Taiwan.” Economic exchange shows stable growth from year to 
year. Cross-Strait’s trade volume in the first 11 months of 2011 reached a 
record sum of 147 billion USD.3'' It is worth underlining that during the last 
years, China has regularly been recording a trade deficit with Taiwan. In 2010, 
it amounted to 86 billion USD.33 45
33 “Historic Taiwan-China trade deal takes effect,” BBC on September 12, 2010, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11275274 (February 10, 2012).
34 "Cross-Straits trade hits record $147b,” Xinhua, China Daily on January 18,2012.
35 "China’s foreign trade flourishes,” Xinhua, China Daily on December 8, 2011.
36 Hsiu-chuan Shis, Vincent Y. Chao, “DPP says ECFA claims are overblown,” 
Taipei Times on June 29,2011.
37 Yan-chih Mo, “WikiLeaks: China using ECFA to push unification,” Taipei Times 
on September 9, 2011.
The agreement, signed by Kuomintang’s government, was strongly criti­
cized by Taiwan’s opposition parties. The Democratic Progressive Party partic­
ularly considered the ECFA as an issue of national identity, and criticized Kuo­
mintang pro-unification policy. Besides, it argued that it did not generate any 
substantial gains for Taiwan’s economy, counteracted spur domestic invest­
ment, dramatically increased unemployment, and caused the outflow of capi­
tal to China. In the presidential campaign before the 2012 elections, DPP's can­
didate Tsai Ing-wen even postulated a referendum on the ECFA.36 The criticism 
of DPP increased after WikiLeaks informed that Beijing intended to use the 
deepening economic relations with Taipei as a means to start political negotia­
tions.37 In response to DPP’s arguments Kuomintang underlined that there 
were no alternatives to ECFA. The controversy was the major subject during a 
television debate between Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen on 25th April 2010. 
During the debate President Ma said: “When we increase exports to mainland 
China, employment will increase and foreign businesses will be willing to in­
vest in Taiwan. We want to create an environment where Taiwan can become 
an Asia-Pacific trade and investment hub and where we will be able to get in 
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step with the rest of the world. In fact, many positive results will gradually be 
seen afterward, results that the DPP views negatively.”38
38 Highlights of President Ma Ying-jeou’s Remarks at the Televised Debate on 
ECFA, April 25, 2010, Taipei: Government Information Office, 2010, http://www.gio. 
gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=63237&ctNode=2462 (February 9, 2012).
39 “Ma’s re-election opens new chances for peaceful cross-Strait relations,” Xin­
hua onjanuary 14, 2012.
40 Zhigang Xing and Zongyang Tan, “Taiwan’s Ma wins tight re-election race,” 
China Daily onjanuary 14, 2012.
41 Yan-chih Mo, "‘One country, two areas’ proposed by Wu Po-hsiung,” Taipei 
Times on March 23, 2012.
42 ‘“1 country, 2 areas’ new basis for dialogue: KMT,” The China Post on March 23, 
2012.
In January 2012, Ma Ying-jeou won a second term in office. According to 
the Xinhua News Agency “Ma’s re-election opens new chances for peaceful 
cross-Strait relations.”39 Commenting the election results, the Taiwan Affairs 
Office of the State Council issued a statement which said that it showed that 
the path of peaceful development of cross-Strait relations over the past four 
years “has been the right road and has won the support of the majority of Tai­
wan compatriots.”40 The first activities of Ma Ying-jeou indicate a continuation 
of the existing policy toward China. It was confirmed in Beijing during the 
meeting of the former KMT chairman Wu Poh-hsiung and the Chinese Presi­
dent Hu Jintao at the annual forum between the KMT and CCP. Both sides 
agreed that cross-Strait relations would be tackled under the banner of ‘one 
country, two areas’ principle (yi guo, Hang qu).41 Wu Poh-hsiung said that the 
mutual relations were not “state-to-state relations” but “special relations.”42 
The new basis of dialog seems to be very close to Deng Xiaoping’s assumption. 
This approach was criticized by the opposition in Taiwan. They argued that it 
could cause instability in Taiwan and lead to increased tension in cross-Strait 
relations. However, such assumptions do not fundamentally change the situa­
tion. By accepting the ‘one country, two areas’ assumption two sides clearly 
understood that they are primarily interested in maintaining the status quo in 
the Taiwan Strait.
Ma’s first decisions were a foreboding of the continuation of the former 
policy, whose assumptions were outlined during the first term of office. In the 
speech inaugurating his second term in May 2012, Ma announced the realiza­
tion of his vision of reforms in the framework of the ‘golden decade’ for the 
country. He presented the five areas of actions concerning the support for 
economic growth, creation of new workplaces and implementation of the rule 
of social justice, development of the environment characterized by low emis­
sion of carbon and high level of green energy usage, support for culture as the 
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source of national strength, and taking active steps for educating, recruiting, 
and keeping talents.43
43 President Ma's Inaugural Address: Upholding Ideals, Working Together for Reform and 
Creating Greater Well-being for Taiwan, Office of the President Republic of China (Taiwan) 
on May 20, 2012, http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid= 
27199&rmid=2355 (July 24, 2012).
44 Ibidem.
Undoubtedly, the situation is favorable, considering that the previous 
parliamentary election in principle strengthened the position of KMT as the 
ruling party. The difference between two opposing camps, ‘blue’ and ‘green,’ 
remained practically unchanged, which reinforces the role of the president 
who takes advantage of a strong support of the parliament. The main opposi­
tional party, succumbed in internal fighting, will have to work out a new mech­
anism of action, particularly with reference to the mainland China. The elec­
tion also strengthened the position of Ma himself and the fraction which he 
represents in the party. In this situation, KMT and the President will set devel­
opmental trends on the island in the near future, and they will not have to 
worry about blockades raised by the opposition.
With reference to China, Ma has underlined the necessity to keep the sta­
tus quo based on the principle of the ‘Three No’s,’ i.e. ‘no’ to unification, ‘no’ to 
independence, and ‘no’ to using force. The promotion of peaceful development 
across the Strait should be based on the ‘one China’ principle and acknowledge 
the assumptions of the 1992 consensus. One should bear in mind, however, 
that ‘one China’ for Taiwan is obviously equal to the Republic of China, similar­
ly to the formerly defined principle ‘one Republic of China, two areas.’ Ma has 
suggested that Taiwanese experiences in establishing democracy may become 
an inspiration for the mainland China. Then, the President expressed hope for 
gradual opening of a more active social participation in the political process on 
the mainland, progressing along with the improvement of human rights, the 
rule of law, and independent development of the civil society, since this may 
reduce the feeling of‘distinctness’ of people on both sides of the Strait.44
With regard to unification, Ma has to keep distance between different op­
tions. Pro-independence groups sharply criticize all emphasized strives for 
reunification. However, the issue of laying the foundations for unification 
seems to be the priority during the next four years of his term. In this situa­
tion, Ma has to skillfully walk a fine line not only between the opposition in his 
country, but also between China and the U.S., who are very interested in the 
issue. Too radical solutions might stir up a storm on any of the sides. There­
fore, the ‘one state, two areas’ concept could have been deliberately softened 
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when President Ma referred to the German model as a proposition for future 
unification in May 2012.
President Ma’s declarations underline the necessity to strengthen the 
achievements of the first term, hence the emphasis on the desire to maintain 
peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. It is worth noting that, in comparison 
with the inauguration speech at the beginning of the first term, there has been 
a change in the tendency which pointed to the search for balance between the 
sphere of internal politics and international issues, including the dialog with 
China. The foreboding of the separation of economic issues from political is­
sues in the cross-Strait relations should be underlined here. In the near future, 
the new administration will prioritize economic issues related to the island’s 
development, mainly in the context of promoting economic cooperation and 
developing new levels of cooperation with China.
A lot will also depend on the new political situation on the mainland in 
the context of the predicted generational shift during the 18th National Con­
gress of the Communist Party of China, in the fall 2012. The main challenges 
for China will have their source inside China. Until now, a rapid development 
with high GDP was persistently assumed. For the last three decades, economic 
reforms have been prioritized, which resulted in neglecting social reforms. 
Unequal development led to the emphasis of a number of social issues. Regions 
are traditionally the kind of places for conducting experiments. Before intro­
ducing any reforms on a national scale, specific solutions are tested on a small­
er scale. In the current conditions, China is searching for the best model which 
could be realized in the following ten years. A similar mechanism of action 
concerns the international space, where China strives for shaping stable sur­
roundings. In March 2012, the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, characterizing the 
areas of action in the international sphere, pointed to the development of 
peaceful relations with the neighboring countries, active participation in the 
mechanisms of cooperation with them, deepening regional cooperation, and 
common effort to create a regional environment based on such elements as 
peace, stability, equality, mutual trust, cooperation, and mutual benefits. 
These assumptions, present also in the defensive sphere, refer mostly to the 
threats to the Chinese strategic interests in East Asia. During the term of Presi­
dent Jiang Zemin, Beijing paid a lot more attention to the main world powers. 
His successor, Hu Jintao, focused more on the close neighbors of China. Such 
an attitude is to a large extent a derivative of the changes occurring in the 
region, connected with a narrower orientation of the American strategy to­
ward the Pacific, as well as inflammation of territorial disputes mostly with 
Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines. Most of the events that influence the ac­
tions of the Chinese diplomacy have their roots in the neighboring countries. 
Therefore, China must to a larger extent give attention to this area. The issues 
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of unsolved territorial disputes will undoubtedly have a significant influence 
on the shape of the Chinese defensive strategy in the near future. Forming 
suitable relations with the United States, entering the Asian area more and 
more strongly, will be a big challenge. China must take into account that 
Americans might intensify their actions in the region which seems very prob­
able in the context of the noticeable reduction of engagement in Iraq and Af­
ghanistan.
Conclusions
It is obvious that the cross-Strait dialog requires patience. The reunification is 
important in China’s national strategy. But we must remember that this issue 
is still very controversial on the island. Most Taiwan residents express their 
support for maintaining the status quo. We have to assume that the reunifica­
tion is a long-term goal. It should not be seen in terms of immediate changes. 
There are at least three elements that could foster integration of two separate 
entities. The first indicates cultural integration. In this matter there are many 
references to the common cultural heritage. No less important are the same 
language, similar traditions and customs. Therefore, culture may affect the 
cooperation between China and Taiwan in the new world order. The second 
factor are the economic issues. Despite possible political tensions, an increase 
of economic interdependence may be observed. On the one hand there are 
many Taiwanese businessmen concentrating their activities on the continent. 
On the other hand, a lot of Chinese people want to invest on the island. Thanks 
to this, two sides could have a possibility to modify local markets and change 
each other in many other fields. The third factor relates to Beijing’s foreign 
policy. The increase of China’s power will lead to the widening of the zone of 
influence. China will strongly oppose the involvement of third states in the 
dispute over the Taiwan Strait. It will continue to express opposition toward 
the U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, and will emphasize that the dispute has internal 
nature. The war between China and Taiwan seems unlikely. Beijing will not use 
force to resolve the Taiwanese issue, because of the possibility of the United 
States’ intervention. China will rather gradually exert the pressure on the au­
thorities in Taipei by using economic and cultural instruments, and will pro­
gressively try to weaken the position of the Americans in this layout.
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